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It is generally recognized that when private actions generate harmful externalities, public
intervention can improve welfare, if it appropriately trades o⁄ social harm reduction with
enforcement costs1 and if legal rules are designed and enforced so as to elicit the least dam-
aging actions, thus achieving maximal ￿marginal deterrence￿(Stigler, 1970; Shavell, 1992;
Mookherjee and Png, 1994, among others).2. But it is less frequently acknowledged that
public interventions may have yet another cost: that of sti￿ ing private sector innovations
that open pro￿t opportunities but may also entail risks for society. The idea that public
intervention may thwart valuable innovative activity dates back at least to the work of
Friedrich Hayek (1935, 1940). But there is no formal analysis, to the best of our knowledge,
of how the design and enforcement of norms should take into account both the risks and
the bene￿ts stemming from private innovative activity.
In this paper we investigate how public policies, including regulation and law enforce-
ment, should be designed when they may a⁄ect ￿rms￿e⁄ort to discover new technologies, as
well as their actual use once discovered. Central to our approach is the idea that research
and development (R&D) often leads to innovations whose impact on welfare is initially
unknown. In this perspective, uncertainty is pervasive: not only research may fail to pro-
duce workable results, but also when it succeeds the deployment of innovations may impact
welfare unpredictably. Since in general public policies will treat ex-post socially harmful
innovations di⁄erently from bene￿cial ones (e.g., it may authorize only the latter), a ￿rm
investing in R&D faces uncertainty as to how public policy will impinge on the results of
its research. Indeed, if policy is expected to drastically reduce the expected pro￿tability of
innovation, the ￿rm will refrain altogether from investing in research ￿a disincentive e⁄ect
that we label ￿average deterrence￿ . As we will see, public policies may di⁄er in average de-
terrence ￿their research-thwarting e⁄ect ￿as well as in marginal deterrence ￿their ability
to steer innovators towards less harmful implementation of their ￿ndings. We argue that
precisely these di⁄erences dictate which is the best policy in each circumstance.
Uncertainty as to the social e⁄ects of innovations may arise in a variety of situations. An
obvious example is that of scienti￿c uncertainty in R&D: a biotech ￿rm may either produce
traditional seeds or research new genetically modi￿ed (GM) seeds that promise higher yields
but may pose unknown risks to public health, for instance causing allergies to consumers.
1The literature on public intervention in the presence of market failures highlights that intervention
should be curtailed if its enforcement is very costly or generates bribery (Krueger, 1974; Rose-Ackerman,
1978; Banerjee, 1997; Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003; Immordino and Pagano, 2008,
among others).
2Seminal contributions on optimal law enforcement are Becker (1968), Becker and Stigler (1974) and
Polinsky and Shavell (2000).
￿1 ￿A second example refers to the introduction of new products in an uncertain market
environment. For instance, a software company may sell an established operating system and
application packages or rather attempt to develop new applications tied to a new operating
system. Depending on the circumstances prevailing when the innovation is marketed, the
new software may raise consumer welfare (due to its greater ease of use) or induce market
foreclosure. Which e⁄ect will prevail depends on the availability of alternative products
on the market when the new software is introduced. Hence, apart from the initial strategic
intentions of the software company about the possible e⁄ects of its new application, its actual
market outcomes will also depend on random events outside of the developer￿ s control when
research is started.
Yet another class of cases may occur in ￿nancial markets: ￿nancial innovation, such
as the introduction of new derivatives or markets, may open new pro￿t opportunities for
intermediaries as well as new hedging tools for investors, but may also create new dangers
for uninformed investors who cannot master the information necessary to handle novel
instruments or trade on new markets. The social harm that can ensue is well exempli￿ed by
the current ￿nancial crisis. In the words of Lloyd Blankfein, CEO of Goldman Sachs, one of
the key lessons of the crisis is that the ￿nancial industry ￿let the growth in new instruments
outstrip the operational capacity to manage them. As a result, operational risk increased
dramatically and this had a direct e⁄ect on the overall stability of the ￿nancial system￿
(Blankfein, 2009, p. 7).
In each of these situations, a policy maker may adopt one of three di⁄erent regulatory
regimes: (i) laissez faire, (ii) a regime based on authorization, whereby innovations can
be exploited commercially only if ex-ante authorized, and (iii) a regime based on penalties,
where behavior is subject to legal rules and sanctioned ex post if found to be socially harmful.
The di⁄erence between the two latter regimes does not lie only in the timing of the policy
intervention ￿ex-ante scrutiny in the former versus ex-post evaluation in the latter ￿but
also in their di⁄erent degree of ￿ exibility: authorization is a ￿yes-or-no￿decision, and as
such it admits no nuances, while penalties can be ￿ne-tuned according to the severity and
likelihood of social harm. But even an authorization regime can be made more lenient by
authorizing ￿rms when there is no decisive evidence that their innovations are harmful,
or stricter by denying authorization in such circumstances, thus requiring evidence that
innovations are bene￿cial.
We show that the greater the social harm that innovations are expected to generate,
the more cogent and blunter should be the chosen form of public intervention, namely the
greater its average deterrence. Speci￿cally, as expected social harm increases, the optimal
intervention switches ￿rst from laissez-faire to a penalty regime, then to a lenient autho-
rization regime, and ￿nally to a strict one. This is precisely because the ￿nes of a penalty
￿2 ￿regime can be smoothly adapted to situations of moderate social harm, whereas the impera-
tive nature of the authorization regime is more suited to situations where innovation is very
likely to be socially harmful.
Interestingly, the principle that the regulatory regime should be attuned to the danger
of social harm is tightly connected to the need to balance such harm with the bene￿ts of
innovation. Indeed, we show in the same setting that if the ￿rm were able to implement
its practices without a preliminary research phase, regulation should rely exclusively on
authorizations (more or less lenient depending on the likelihood of social harm), and laissez-
faire would be never optimal. The reason is that when the incentives to innovate are not
an issue, the regulator simply wishes to deter actions that are expected to be socially
harmful: since in our setting even maximal penalties would have limited deterrence, they
are dominated by the authorization regime, where such actions can simply be banned. This
also explains why laissez faire is optimal for innovative activities that are expected to raise
welfare (even though marginal deterrence is forgone), while it is dominated when innovation
is not part of the picture (and marginal deterrence is the only issue). This is an aspect of
the general point that regulation should be softer in innovative industries.
It should be noticed that marginal deterrence, which is at the center of the traditional
approach in law and economics, is present also in our penalty regime, where ￿nes a⁄ect
the choice among new actions that the ￿rm takes if its research has been successful. How-
ever, this traditional e⁄ect is shown to interact with average deterrence that, by acting
on the incentives to innovate, a⁄ects at the same rate the probability of taking any of the
new actions. In the penalty regime marginal deterrence is always desirable, while average
deterrence improves welfare only when social harm is su¢ ciently likely.
In the literature, our analysis is related to Shavell (1984), who analyzes four determinants
of the choice between an authorization and a penalty regime, in his context respectively
labeled as safety regulation and liability: (i) di⁄erence in risk knowledge; (ii) incentive or
ability to enforce penalties; (iii) magnitude of administrative costs, and (iv) magnitude of
maximal ￿nes. In our analysis, we set factors (i) to (iii) equal across the two regimes,
and assume maximal ￿nes to equal the maximum pro￿ts in the penalty regime. These
assumptions are made to focus attention on the role of innovation in the choice between
the two regimes (and laissez-faire), eliminating other sources of di⁄erential e⁄ectiveness
between them.3
3Our analysis is also related to Kaplow (1995), which is the only other paper where to our knowledge the
design of the law a⁄ects agents￿learning decisions. In his setting, more complex rules allow better control
over individual behavior but are harder for people to understand ex ante and for courts to apply ex post. In
his setting, individuals can choose not to learn, and take actions ignoring the associated e⁄ects (and ￿nes).
Our model di⁄ers from his in that new actions can be taken only upon learning.
￿3 ￿Our model also shares some features with the ￿activity level￿model of law enforcement
(Shavell, 1980 and 2007; Polinsky and Shavell, 2000). In that model, private bene￿ts and
social harm depend on two di⁄erent decisions by agents ￿an activity level (say, how long
an individual drives a car, or whether or how far a certain production is run) and a level of
precaution (driving speed, or adopting safety measures in the production process) ￿and the
analysis typically compares the e⁄ects of di⁄erent liability rules (strict versus fault-based
liability). Our innovative activity is reminiscent of the activity level, while the choice of
new actions parallels the choice of precaution. But our timing and information structure
di⁄er from those of the standard activity model. There, agents typically choose activity and
precaution simultaneously and knowing perfectly the e⁄ect of their actions on welfare and
the rules that will apply to them; the design of these rules aims at steering their choices so as
to minimize social harm. So the issue is only one of marginal deterrence. In contrast, in our
model when ￿rms choose their research e⁄ort, they still ignore whether they will produce
a bene￿cial or a harmful innovation, and therefore consider the policies designed for both
cases as potentially relevant to them. Through this veil of ignorance, policies devised to
penalize socially harmful innovations may end up deterring from research even ￿rms that
would in fact produce bene￿cial innovations. That is why uncertainty is key to what we call
average deterrence.
The model that comes closest to ours is that of Schwartzstein and Schleifer (2009),
who investigate when and how the optimal policy combines ex-ante regulation and ex-post
litigation in the activity model. They consider a setting where safe and unsafe ￿rms decide
whether to produce and may take precautions. Firms face uncertainty as to the liability
for damages that will apply to them, due to the assumption that courts can make errors: a
judge may mistake a safe ￿rm for an unsafe one, which creates a disincentive e⁄ect for safe
￿rms. If the regulator can identify safe ￿rms ex ante (or at least is better at it than courts),
it is optimal for regulation to set these ￿rms free from liability for damages, since the social
bene￿ts of their activity exceeds the expected harm from taking too few precautions. This
parallels our ￿nding that regulation should be softer when social harm is unlikely. But
our analysis di⁄ers from Schwartzstein and Schleifer￿ s one, as it considers uncertainty as
inherent to the social e⁄ects of ￿rms￿research activity, rather than as arising from judicial
errors. As such, it applies uniformly to any form of policy intervention, and does not per se
favor any regime over others.4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents two
benchmark cases: the ￿rst best, where the regulator directly control ￿rms￿choices, and the
4The role of judicial errors in our setting is analyzed in Immordino and Polo (2008), who show that
average deterrence determines new e⁄ects of errors in law enforcement compared to the traditional results
in the law enforcement literature. This setting is also extended to include agency problems in enforcement
arising from opportunistic enforcers and the potential for bribery, in Immordino, Pagano and Polo (2006).
￿4 ￿laissez-faire regime, where ￿rms￿actions are unrestricted. Section 4 analyzes the regime
based on authorizations, Section 5 that based on penalties, Section 6 presents the overall
optimal policy in the presence of innovative activity, and Section 7 compares it with the
optimal policy in the absence of innovative activity. Section 8 concludes. All the proofs are
in the Appendix.
2 Setup
We consider a pro￿t-maximizing ￿rm that must choose whether to invest in R&D activity or
not. If the ￿rm does not invest in such activity, it can select only among known actions, e.g.
familiar technologies. If instead the ￿rm invests and succeeds in its research e⁄ort, it expands
its opportunity set. In many instances, the new actions made possible by innovation, though
expected to be pro￿table, may have unknown social e⁄ects. For instance, a biotech ￿rm
may produce traditional seeds or experiment with new GM seeds that promise higher yields
but pose unknown risks to public health.
To contain the potential hazards posed by innovative activity, public policy may con-
strain the actions of successful innovators either by subjecting them to an ex-ante noti￿-
cation and authorization requirement (authorization) or to an ex-post penalty enforcement
regime (penalty). Under the authorization regime, the ￿rm noti￿es to a public agency (such
as the Food and Drugs Administration) the action it plans to undertake based on the results
of its research (e.g., the marketing of a speci￿c GM seed), and the agency decides whether
the ￿rm is allowed to do so or not, after carrying out an investigation on the potential
implied harm. In contrast, under a penalty regime the ￿rm is free to choose any new action
made possible by its research ￿ndings (in our example, market any new GM seed), but may
be liable ex-post to pay a ￿ne if this action causes social harm. Public policies must trade o⁄
the social gains arising from the ￿rm￿ s innovations (a larger harvest) against their potential
social harm (a public health hazard). The key issue to be explored is how this trade-o⁄
shapes the optimal design of both the authorization and the penalty regime, as well as the
choice between the two.
In our analysis, the ￿rm is assumed to know how to implement the status-quo action a0
(selling traditional seeds), with associated pro￿ts ￿0 and welfare W0, which are normalized
to zero with no loss of generality: ￿0 = W0 = 0. In contrast, carrying out a new action
requires innovative activity (experiments with GM seeds). If the investment is unsuccessful,
the ￿rm must implement the status-quo action a0. If it is successful, the ￿rm discovers how
to implement a set of new actions A = (0;a], with associated pro￿ts ￿ = ￿a, where ￿ > 0.
In this case, the ￿rm is also assumed to learn the state of nature s 2 fb;gg: in the bad state
b, the innovation is socially harmful, whereas in the good state g it is bene￿cial. Proceeding
￿5 ￿with our example, the biotech company learns not only how to produce new GM seeds, but
also the dangers that they pose to public health.
Depending on the state of nature s, the social consequences of new actions are described
by one of two di⁄erent functions. In state b, which occurs with probability ￿, new actions
decrease welfare according to Wb = ￿wa, with w > 0. In the bad state, private incentives
con￿ ict with social welfare since a new action a yields pro￿t ￿a but reduces welfare by
wa. Hence, the probability ￿ measures the misalignment between public interest and ￿rms￿
objectives: in our example, ￿ is the prior probability that GM seeds will pose a health
hazard.5 Instead, in the good state g, that occurs with probability 1 ￿ ￿, new actions raise
welfare according to the function Wg = wa. In this state, the social gains from innovation
exceed private ones, that is, w > ￿, or equivalently new actions increase consumer as well
as producer surplus.6
The amount of resources I that the ￿rm invests in research determines its chances of
success: for simplicity, I is assumed to coincide with the ￿rm￿ s success probability, so that






where c > ￿ ensures an internal solution for the choice of I. After choosing its investment
I in innovative activity and learning its outcome, the ￿rm selects the pro￿t-maximizing
action among the feasible ones (which invariably include the status-quo action) under the
constraints imposed by public policy.
3 Benchmarks: ￿rst best and laissez faire
As the opportunities created by innovation generate either positive or negative externalities,
depending on the state of nature, public policy may be bene￿cial. To evaluate the bene￿ts
of public interventions, it is useful to benchmark them against the ￿rst-best outcome (FB),
which would obtain if the regulator could control ￿rms￿choices I and a directly, and a
laissez faire regime (LF), where ￿rms are free to choose whichever action they like.
Unconstrained welfare maximization calls for action a in the good state and action a0
5A more complex setting can be imagined, in which social harm arises only over a subset of the new
actions in A, so that even in the bad state not all the projects are socially harmful. This extension would
complicate the analysis without adding any substantive result.
6The assumption that pro￿ts and welfare are linear in actions allows us to compare analytically the
authorization and liability regime. Without linearity, this comparison could only be e⁄ected via numerical
simulations.
￿6 ￿in the bad state, so that the ￿rst-best expected welfare is









which is increasing in the likelihood of the good state 1 ￿ ￿ and in the associated welfare
gain wa, and decreasing in the marginal cost of innovative activity c.
In the polar opposite scenario of laissez faire, ￿rms will opt for action a whenever their
research e⁄orts have been successful, irrespective of the state. Therefore, their expected






which can exceed the ￿rst-best level in (2) or fall short of it, depending on the likelihood
1￿￿ of the good state. The welfare level associated with the laissez-faire level of investment
is













where in the second step we denote the expected marginal welfare of action a by Ew ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)w ￿ ￿w .
In what follows, the policy maker is assumed not to control ￿rms￿choices directly, but
to in￿ uence them either via authorizations or via penalties. In the authorization regime,
public intervention occurs ex ante, as ￿rms cannot implement their preferred action unless
a public agency agrees to it. In contrast, in the penalty regime ￿rms are free to implement
their preferred action, but are aware that public intervention may occur ex post in the form
of ￿nes, whenever social harm is recognized to have occurred.
We assume policy makers to be benevolent, in the sense that public policies are designed
and enforced so as to maximize social welfare. Since at any stage and under any regime
public decisions are taken according to this goal, we can avoid to de￿ne precisely the insti-
tutional framework in which the public policies are designed and enforced. In our analysis
we just refer to an ￿agency￿ , which might be a legislator, a regulator, an authority or a
judge depending on the relevant regime.
4 Authorization
In the authorization regime, after a ￿rm noti￿es the action that it wishes to undertake, the
authorizing agency investigates whether the action is socially harmful or not, and obtains
￿7 ￿decisive evidence about its social e⁄ects with probability p, while it ￿nds no evidence in
either direction with probability 1￿p. If the evidence is decisive, the authorization is given
if and only if the evidence is favorable. If the evidence is indecisive, instead, the agency can
opt for one of two rules: a ￿lenient authorization￿(LA) rule whereby when in doubt the
￿rm is authorized, or a ￿strict authorization￿rule (SA) whereby in such circumstances the
authorization is denied. Hence, under the LA regime the ￿rm is authorized as long as no
social harm is proved, while under the SA rule new actions are permitted only if proved to
be socially bene￿cial. When the authorization is denied, the ￿rm must take the status-quo
action a0.
The timing of the game is illustrated in Figure 1. At t = 0 the agency chooses between
regime LA, SA and laissez faire (LF).7 At t = 1 the ￿rm chooses its innovative activity
I and with probability I discovers the set of new actions A and the state of nature s. At
t = 2, in regimes LA and SA the ￿rm noti￿es the agency of the new action it wishes to
undertake. At t = 3 the agency obtains with probability p evidence on the social e⁄ects of
the proposed action, and decides whether to authorize it or not. At t = 4 the ￿rm carries
out the authorized action (if any), and the corresponding private and social payo⁄s are
realized. Under the LF regime, one moves directly from t = 1 to the ￿nal stage t = 4, and
the ￿rm is free to implement any action it wants.
[Insert Figure 1]
Since by assumption the new actions in A are more pro￿table than the status-quo action
a0, if research is successful the ￿rm always applies to be authorized to carry out the highest
(most pro￿table) new action a.8 In the LA regime, the ￿rm anticipates that the agency
will always authorize it in the good state (whether it uncovers favorable evidence or not),
and will authorize it only with probability 1￿p in the bad state (that is, only if no decisive
evidence is uncovered). Therefore, in this regime the ￿rm will take action a with probability
(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿(1 ￿ p), and its expected pro￿ts are









7In all cases, it commits to such regime for the entire game.
8In the present setting it is equivalent for the ￿rm to require an authorization on all the new actions A
or just for the selected action a.
￿8 ￿The corresponding level of expected welfare is



















Under the SA regime, instead, the agency will authorize action a only if it uncovers favorable
evidence, which happens exclusively in the good state. Hence action a will be authorized
with probability (1 ￿ ￿)p, and the ￿rm￿ s expected pro￿ts are









Clearly, the lenient rule is associated with greater investment in innovation than the strict
one (ILA > ISA), because it leaves greater expected pro￿ts to innovators. The welfare level
associated with the SA regime is











The following lemma establishes that the lenient rule ￿being more permissive towards
innovators ￿is optimal if and only if innovation is su¢ ciently unlikely to cause social harm:
Lemma 1 (Optimal authorization) There exists a value e ￿ 2 (0;1) such that the lenient
authorization regime is preferred to the strict one i⁄ ￿ 6 e ￿.
5 Penalties
In the penalty regime, successful innovators can implement their preferred action a but
anticipate that they may be liable to pay a ￿ne if the action is found to have caused social
harm. This occurs when the agency obtains de￿nite evidence that the chosen action was
socially harmful, which happens with probability p as in the authorization regime.9 In this
regime, an action a 2 A that causes social harm relative to the status quo (￿wa < 0) is
punished according to a ￿ne schedule f(a) chosen in the interval [0;F] and non-decreasing in
social harm. This legal rule, that in our example would prohibit to commercialize hazardous
9As argued in the introduction, the assumption that in both regimes law enforcers obtain decisive evidence
with the same probability is made to avoid biasing the comparison between them with assumptions regarding
the relative e¢ ciency of enforcement.
￿9 ￿GM seeds, is e⁄ect-based, as it punishes only actions that are ex-post socially damaging and
does so in proportion to the harm caused.10
Fines are assumed to have limited deterrence: they cannot exceed the pro￿ts that suc-
cessful innovators can earn from their preferred action, that is, F = ￿a.11 This is the
interesting case, since if the maximum ￿ne F were unbounded, the penalty regime would
always dominate the authorization regime: by in￿ icting su¢ ciently high ￿nes, an agency
could prevent the ￿rm from taking new actions if socially damaging, while still allowing
them if bene￿cial.
The timing of the game for the penalty regime is illustrated in Figure 2. At t = 0 the
agency chooses between the penalty regime P and laissez faire LF. In the former case,
it sets a ￿ne schedule f(a). At t = 1, the ￿rm chooses innovative activity I and with
probability I discovers the set of new actions A and the state of nature s. At t = 2 it
decides which action a to take. At time t = 3 the private and social payo⁄s are realized.
At time t = 4 the agency investigates the action a, ￿nds decisive evidence about its social
e⁄ects with probability p and, if it does, levies the ￿ne f(a). Of course, this enforcement
stage only occurs if laissez faire was not chosen at t = 0.
[Insert Figure 2]
The choice of actions at t = 2 depends on the outcome of the ￿rm￿ s innovative activity at
t = 1 and on the ￿ne schedule f(a) designed by the agency at t = 0. When innovative activity
is unsuccessful, the ￿rm carries out the status-quo action a0. Instead, when successful the
￿rm can take new actions a 2 A. If these are socially bene￿cial, all of them are lawful, so
that the ￿rm picks the highest action a. If instead the new actions are socially harmful,
they are illegal but cannot be completely deterred by ￿nes (since F = ￿a). The ￿rm chooses
the unlawful action b a that maximizes its pro￿ts, net of the expected ￿ne:
b a = argmax
a2A
[￿a ￿ pf(a)]
Referring again to our example, if innovative activity is unsuccessful, the ￿rm sells traditional
seeds, while if successful the biotech ￿rm markets the most pro￿table type of seeds if it does
10For a discussion on an e⁄ect-based interpretation of antitrust rules, see Gual et al. (2005). Here we adopt
a notion of illegality based on ex-post social harm. All our results regarding the penalty regime, however,
are robust to a more formalistic de￿nition of illegality, whereby an action is deemed to be illegal based on its
characteristics rather than on its e⁄ects. The key point in this case is that at least some of the characteristics
of the action that make it ex-post unlawful are not observed ex-ante, when the innovative activity is exerted.
11This condition re￿ ect the idea that the ￿rm has no other wealth to be seized by authorities, and that its
owners are protected by limited liability.
￿10 ￿not pose any concern for public health, or a less pro￿table variety if it is dangerous, taking
into account the corresponding ￿nes it may be called to pay. We summarize this discussion
as follows:
Lemma 2 (Actions) At stage 2, given the ￿ne schedule f(a), the ￿rm chooses (i) a0 if the
innovative activity is unsuccessful; (ii) a if it is successful and the new actions are socially
bene￿cial; (iii) b a if it is successful and the new actions are socially harmful.
At stage 1 the ￿rm chooses the innovative activity I so as to maximize its expected
pro￿ts, anticipating the optimal actions to be taken at stage 2. In terms of our example,
the biotech ￿rm chooses its investment in R&D, taking into account which GM seeds it will
market if successful. Its expected pro￿ts at this stage are:




where the subscript P indicates that this expression refers to the penalty regime. The
expression in square brackets is the expected gain from innovative activity, net of expected
￿nes. Due to incomplete deterrence, this expression is always positive, implying that the
￿rm will always perform some innovative activity. Notice that, since when I is chosen the
￿rm does not yet know whether the innovations will be socially bene￿cial (lawful) or harmful
(unlawful), it mixes up the legal treatment of the two cases according to the likelihood of
each state of the world.
Maximizing (9) with respect to I yields:
Lemma 3 (Innovative activity) At stage 1, given the ￿ne schedule f(a), the optimal
level of innovative activity is
IP =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿a + ￿[￿b a ￿ pf(b a)]
c
:
We now turn to the design of the ￿ne schedule at stage 0. The in￿ uence of law enforce-
ment and penalties on ￿rms￿behavior is twofold: it a⁄ects both the choice of the action
a when innovation succeeds, and the incentives to pursue innovative activity I in the ￿rst
place. The ￿rst role of ￿nes is known in the literature on law enforcement as marginal
deterrence, that is, the ability of ￿nes to guide private choices among unlawful actions.12
The second role, which is absent in standard models, stems from the impact of ￿nes on
innovative activity, and therefore on the probability that any new action a will be taken.
For this reason we label this second e⁄ect average deterrence. The legislator sets the policy
parameters considering both e⁄ects on private choices and, ultimately on welfare.
12See the seminal work by Stigler (1970) and, for a more general treatment, Mookherjee and Png (1994).
￿11 ￿The ￿ne schedule must be designed so as to elicit the lowest possible b a. For instance,
an environmental agency must induce ￿rms to opt for the safest type of GM seeds among
those that they are willing to produce. Since the pro￿t function ￿a is increasing, it is easy




f > 0 if a 6 e a
f 6 F if a > e a
(10)
We rely on Figure 3 to illustrate this point. The function (10) shifts the pro￿t function ￿a
downward by f to the left of point e a, and by f > f to its right, creating a local maximum
at e a. To induce the ￿rm to choose e a, this must however be a global maximum of the pro￿t
function, requiring
￿e a ￿ pf > ￿a ￿ pf:
Being a global maximum, this action corresponds to that chosen by the ￿rm, that is e a = b a
according to our previous notation. Moreover, the lowest action that satis￿es this weak
inequality is the welfare maximizing one. This action b a is implicitly de￿ned by
￿b a ￿ pf = ￿a ￿ pf; (11)
so that




Therefore, action b a(f;f) is decreasing in f and increasing in f, so that a wider range of ￿nes
allows the agency to implement a less damaging action b a, that is, raise marginal deterrence.13
[Insert Figure 3]
Substituting equation (11) in expression (9) yields the pro￿t that the ￿rm expects to














which is decreasing in the highest possible ￿ne f:
13The ￿gure also helps understanding why there is not a unique non-decreasing ￿ne schedule f(a) capable
of inducing the action b a: any non-decreasing function that penalizes action b a with f ,action a with f and
such that ￿a ￿ pf(a) 6 ￿a ￿ pf for a 2 (b a;a) will induce the same choice. For example, this is true of a
schedule that punishes actions below b a with f and those above it with a penalty that makes expected pro￿ts
constant.
￿12 ￿As explained above, the ￿ne schedule, and in particular its parameters f > 0 and
f 6 F, must be designed taking into account their e⁄ect not only on the choice of the
action b a(f;f) (marginal deterrence) but also on the choice of the innovative activity IP(f)
(average deterrence). The expected welfare is
E(WP) = IP(f)
￿














so that f is optimally set at its lower bound, i.e. f = 0. The welfare e⁄ect of the highest
￿ne f is instead described by a more complex expression:
@E(WP)
@f
= [￿EW ￿ cIP(￿)]
@IP




@f | {z }
marginal deterrence (+)
; (15)
where ￿EW = (1￿￿)wa￿￿wb a(￿) is the expected welfare from the innovative activity and
the term in squared brackets is its marginal social value. The ￿rst term in the derivative
captures the average deterrence of f and the second its marginal deterrence. The average
deterrence e⁄ect of the highest ￿ne f depends on the marginal social value of innovative
activity, ￿EW ￿cIP. If this is negative, a higher ￿ne f raises social welfare by discouraging
undesirable innovations (since @IP=@f < 0); if positive, instead, a higher ￿ne would be
socially detrimental. In contrast, the marginal deterrence e⁄ect of a higher f invariably
raises welfare, as it allows to implement less damaging actions in the bad state (@b a=@f < 0).
This is re￿ ected by the fact that the second term of the derivative is unambiguously positive.
As a result, three di⁄erent cases may arise, for di⁄erent values of the probability ￿ of
the bad state. If this state is very unlikely, that is, ￿ is below the lower bound
￿0 ￿ max
￿





then the ￿rst term in (15) is negative and can be shown to determine the sign of the
derivative. In this case, it is optimal to set f = 0, which is equivalent to the laissez-faire
regime LF. In the opposite case where social harm is very likely (￿ close to 1), then average
deterrence enhances welfare (or mildly reduces it), and the derivative (15) becomes positive:
in this case, it is optimal to set the highest ￿ne at its largest admissible value so as to
discourage innovative activity: f = F = ￿a. This applies for ￿ above the upper bound
￿1 ￿ max
￿
w ￿ w ￿ ￿




￿13 ￿Notice that ￿1 > ￿0 > 0 only if ￿ < w ￿w, that is, if private incentives to innovate are not
too strong. If so, for values of ￿ comprised in the interval between ￿0 and ￿1 we have an
internal solution:14
f(￿) =
￿a[w(1 + ￿) ￿ w(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿]
￿p(2w + ￿)
: (18)
If instead ￿ > w￿w, then ￿0 = ￿1 = 0, so that it is optimal to set the ￿ne f at its maximal
level F for any ￿. To summarize:
Lemma 4 (Optimal ￿nes) If ￿ < w ￿ w, for ￿ 6 ￿0 the optimal policy is laissez faire
LF (f = f = 0); for ￿0 < ￿ 6 ￿1, the optimal ￿nes are
f(a) =
(
0 if a 6 b a;
f(￿) if a > b a
(19)
where f(￿) is given by (18) and is increasing in ￿; for ￿1 < ￿ 6 1, they are
f(a) =
(
0 if a 6 b a;
F if a > b a:
(20)
If instead ￿ > w ￿ w the optimal policy entails (20) for ￿ 2 (0;1].
Therefore, as the probability of social harm ￿ increases, the optimal ￿ne becomes grad-
ually sti⁄er, from 0 to f(￿) and ￿nally to F. Thereby it induces successful innovators to





a for ￿ 2 [0;￿0);
a ￿
pf(￿)







￿ = a(1 ￿ p) for ￿ 2 (￿1;1]:
Even though the optimal policy just derived tends to counter the social harm associated




























for ￿ 2 (￿1;1];
(21)
where Ew ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)w ￿ ￿w. This expression is continuous across the three regions, it is
linear in ￿ for ￿ 2 [0;￿0) and convex for ￿ 2 [￿0;1]. Note that, if ￿ > w ￿ w, so that
￿0 = ￿1 = 0, expected welfare is given by the expression on the third line for any ￿.








￿14 ￿6 Optimal policy
We are now equipped to derive the optimal policy regime, by comparing social welfare (21)
in the penalty regime with the corresponding expression (4) obtained under laissez faire
and with expressions (6) and (8) for the authorization regimes. Our ￿rst step requires to
￿nd out which of the two authorization regimes is to be compared to the penalty regime for
each possible value of ￿. To this purpose, it is useful to note that
￿0 < ￿1 < e ￿; (22)
as shown in the Appendix. Therefore, lenient authorization ￿which dominates strict autho-
rization for ￿ 6 e ￿ ￿must be evaluated against the regime with penalties and against laissez
faire. Only for ￿ > e ￿ strict authorization is to be compared with the penalty regime. We
are now ready to compare the various regimes:
Proposition 1 (Optimal policy) The optimal regime requires:15
(i) laissez faire for 0 6 ￿ 6 ￿0;
(ii) positive and increasing penalties for ￿0 < ￿ 6 ￿1;
(iii) indi⁄erently, the maximum penalty or lenient authorization for ￿1 < ￿ 6 e ￿;
(iv) strict authorization for e ￿ < ￿ 6 1:
Therefore, public intervention becomes increasingly stringent as the danger of social
harm increases: as ￿ goes up, the optimal policy changes from laissez-faire to a penalty
regime, then to a lenient authorization regime and ￿nally to a strict one. The comparison
underscores a key di⁄erence between penalties and authorizations: a penalty regime is more
￿ exible, since ￿nes can be adapted to the likelihood of social harm, whereas authorizations
are more rigid, being ￿yes-or-no￿decisions. As a result, penalties can be smoothly adapted
to situations of moderate social harm, where they are preferable to the harsher authorization
regime. By the same token, the imperative nature of the authorization regime is more suited
to situations where innovation is very likely to be socially harmful.16
It is interesting to consider how ￿rms will choose the level of innovative activity when
for each value of ￿ the policy maker adopts the corresponding optimal regime described in
Proposition 1:
15Keep in mind that if ￿ > w ￿ w, then ￿0 = ￿1 = 0 and the ￿rst two cases disappear.
16It is worth recalling that the intervals where the preferred policy is laissez-faire or a ￿ne below the
maximum level (that is, where ￿ < ￿1) vanish when ￿ > w￿w: intuitively, when the pro￿ts from innovation
are very large, deterring social harm requires either the maximum ￿ne or an authorization regime.
￿15 ￿Proposition 2 (Optimal innovative activity) If the policy regime is optimally chosen,
the level of innovative activity b I(￿) is constant for ￿ 6 ￿0 and decreasing for ￿ > ￿0.
Moreover, compared to the ￿rst best IFB, there is underinvestment for small ￿ and overin-
vestment for large ￿.
The ￿nding that investment is decreasing in ￿ as soon as policy departs from laissez faire
results from the increasing strictness of policy intervention in response to the increasing
potential harm from innovation. Yet, the level of innovative activity is sub-optimally low
when social harm is unlikely and sub-optimally large when social harm is likely. The reason
for this apparent paradox is that in the ￿rst case ￿rms do not internalize the entire expected
social gain from innovative activity, so that even laissez faire does not provide su¢ ciently
large incentives to innovate: a subsidy to innovative activity would actually be called for.
Similarly, when innovation is likely to be harmful, ￿rms do not fully internalize the expected
social loss they cause, in spite of the fact that the strictness of regulation is increasing in
the magnitude of the social harm. This is because regulation is assumed to be imperfectly
enforced, since social harm is not identi￿ed with certainty and ￿nes have limited deterrence.
7 The model without innovative activity
It is worth comparing the results obtained so far with those that would arise in a setting
where ￿rms can implement the actions in A without exerting any investment in innovation,
as it is the case within the standard model of law enforcement. As we will see, this change
in assumptions drastically alters the conclusions about the optimal policies required to deal
with social harm arising from the ￿rms￿actions. We consider the same regimes as in previous
sections, and for each of them compute the associated expected welfare, so as to rank them.
In the laissez-faire regime , the expected welfare is simply that associated with action a
by ￿rms, that is, E(WLF) = (1 ￿ ￿)wa ￿ ￿a.
In the authorization and liability regimes, the time lines are the same as in Section 4
and in Section 5 respectively, simply removing stage 1, in which the ￿rm chooses the level
of innovative activity. In the authorization regime, the expected welfare turns out to be
E(WLA) = (1 ￿ ￿)wa ￿ ￿(1 ￿ p)wa (23)
if the agency is lenient in granting authorizations, and
E(WSA) = (1 ￿ ￿)pwa (24)
if the agency is strict.
￿16 ￿In the penalty regime, the ￿rm chooses the same actions identi￿ed in Lemma 2 if suc-
cessful in innovating. If the innovation is socially harmful, it will choose b a, as given by
(12), and a otherwise. In this setting, public policy a⁄ects private incentives only through
marginal deterrence, and the ￿ne is always maximal if the probability ￿ of social harm is
positive, as in Becker (1968). To see this, note that social welfare is














Therefore the optimal ￿ne schedule is f = 0 and f = F for any positive ￿, and the expected
welfare associated with the optimal policy is




Comparing expected welfare across the various regimes, one ￿nds that:
Proposition 3 (Optimal policy without innovative activity) When new actions do
not require innovative activity, authorizations always dominate penalties, with lenient au-
thorization for ￿ 6 w=(w + w) and strict authorization otherwise.
Proposition 3 indicates that, absent innovative activity, public policies should rely ex-
clusively on authorizations (more lenient or stricter depending on the likelihood of social
harm), and laissez faire is never optimal. The reason for this result is that in this setting
penalties have the drawback of limited deterrence, even when set at the maximum level.
The authorization regime overcomes this limitations by simply barring ￿rms from carrying
out undesirable actions, a more drastic form of marginal deterrence.
This stark choice of regulatory tools is in sharp contrast with the richer array of regu-
latory regimes prescribed by Proposition 1 in the presence of innovative activity. In that
case, authorization is optimal only when social harm is very likely, while penalties are used
when it is moderately likely, and laissez faire is preferable when it is unlikely. In the stan-
dard model, authorization always dominates other regimes because regulation should not
be concerned with hampering innovative activity: the only policy objective is to guide ￿rms
towards an optimal choice of actions, and to this purpose authorization is a more powerful
tool. In contrast, if new actions require costly private investment, the regulator must also be
concerned with the need to avoid discouraging innovation when it is unlikely to have harmful
e⁄ects. To this purpose, authorization is too blunt a tool, hence the need to have recourse
to more nuanced policies. In other words, in the standard model only marginal deterrence
matters. In contrast, in the presence of innovative activity policies must be judged also on
the basis of their average deterrence, that is, of their disincentive e⁄ects on innovation.
￿17 ￿8 Conclusion
The literature on law enforcement has disregarded that norms may a⁄ect the decision to
invest in innovative activity. We ￿ll this gap by presenting a model where ￿rms can invest
in such an activity (e.g., R&D) and then, contingent upon successful innovation, undertake
new types of production that, although privately pro￿table, may prove harmful to society.
In such cases, public policy should design the intervention so as to balance the prevention
of social harm with the bene￿ts from innovative activity, and therefore try to preserve ￿rms￿
incentives to innovate as far as possible. We consider three di⁄erent regulatory regimes: (i)
laissez faire, (ii) a regime where innovations can be exploited commercially only if autho-
rized, and (ii) a regime where ￿rms are penalized ex post according to a legal rule if their
innovations are found to be socially harmful, the severity of the penalty depending on the
magnitude of social harm. We also distinguish two variants of authorization regimes: a
more lenient one where ￿rms are authorized to exploit all innovations that are not proven
to be harmful, and a stricter one where only innovations that are proven to be safe are
authorized.
Our key result is that the regulatory regime should become increasingly stringent as the
danger of social harm increases: when such danger is very low, laissez faire is optimal; as
the danger of social harm rises, regulation should switch to a regime of penalties, then to a
lenient authorization regime, and ￿nally to a strict one. This is because ex-post penalties
can be calibrated to di⁄erent situations of moderate social harm, whereas the more drastic
nature of ex-ante authorization is more suited to control the commercial use of innovations
that are very likely to cause social harm.
We also show that this principle is tightly connected to the assumption that the regulated
￿rms invest in (potentially bene￿cial) innovative activity. If the ￿rm can take the new
actions without engaging in any preliminary research activity, the optimal form of regulation
becomes the authorization regime (more or less lenient depending on the likelihood of social
harm), and laissez-faire is never optimal, as in this case the regulator simply wishes to
deter potentially harmful actions. Due to its limited deterrence, a regime based on penalties
would be less e⁄ective in this case. In conclusion, we show that the regulation of innovative
industries should be designed quite di⁄erently from that of traditional ones: as a general
principle, it should play on a wider range of regulatory regimes, and in many circumstances
it should be ￿softer￿so as to preserve private incentives to innovate.
￿18 ￿Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Since in all regimes social welfare is a function of ￿, we
shall refer to it as W(￿). The Lemma is proved in three steps. First, we show that


















(1 ￿ p)2(w +
￿
2
) < E(WSA(1)) = 0:


















































Hence, the two functions cross only once, for some e ￿ 2 (0;1).
Proof of Lemma 4. The ￿ne (18) gives the optimal unconstrained policy. It must





￿a[w ￿ w ￿ ￿]p(2w + ￿)
[￿p(2w + ￿)]
2 > 0:
Setting f(￿) = 0 and solving for ￿ we obtain ￿ = ￿0 > 0 if w ￿ w ￿ ￿ > 0. Then, for any
￿ < ￿0 the constraint f > 0 binds and we have the corner solution f = 0: Analogously,
setting f(￿) = F = ￿a and solving for ￿ we obtain:
￿1 =
w ￿ w ￿ ￿
w + w ￿ p(￿ + 2w)
< 1: (26)
Notice that 0 < ￿0 < ￿1 if w ￿ w ￿ ￿ > 0. Finally, for ￿ > ￿1 the constraint f 6 F binds
and we have the corner solution f = F.
Proof of equation (22). From Lemma 1 we know that if E(WLA(￿0)) RE(WSA(￿0))
for any given ￿0, then ￿0 Q e ￿. Substituting ￿0 = ￿1 in these two expressions for expected




(w + w)2(1 ￿ p)2(￿ + 2w)






(2w ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ p)2p2(￿ + 2w)2
2[w + w ￿ p(￿ + 2w)]
2 :
From this, we have:
sign[E(WLA(￿1)) ￿ E(WSA(￿1))] = sign[(w + w)2(￿ + 2w) ￿ p2(￿ + 2w)2(2w ￿ ￿)] > 0
since this latter expression corresponds to (￿ + 2w)(w ￿ w ￿ ￿)2 > 0 when p = 1, and it is
therefore a fortiori positive when p < 1. Hence, we have ￿1 < e ￿. Since ￿0 < ￿1, it follows
that ￿0 < ￿1 < e ￿.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us start by considering the case in which ￿ < w ￿w, so
that 0 < ￿0 < ￿1.
First, for ￿ 2 [0;￿0], the penalty regime is equivalent to laissez faire, and the lenient
authorization regime dominates the strict one since ￿0 < e ￿. Hence, the relevant comparison
is between laissez faire and a lenient authorization regime. Expected welfare is larger under
the former, since








+ w) + (1 ￿ ￿)w ￿ (1 + ￿)w ￿ ￿
i
> 0
when ￿ < ￿0. To see this, consider that the term in the square brackets is decreasing in ￿,
and is positive when evaluated for ￿ = ￿0. Hence it is positive for any ￿ < ￿0.
Second, let us consider the interval ￿ 2 (￿0;￿1]. Since ￿1 < e ￿, in this interval the
expected welfare in the penalty regime, E(WP(￿)), is given by the expression in the second
line of (21). As this is an unconstrained maximum, it cannot be lower than the expression
in the third line of (21), where the ￿ne is set at F. The latter expression in turn equals
the expected welfare in the lenient authorization regime, E(WLA(￿)), which is the preferred
regime in the authorization policy for all ￿ < e ￿. Hence, the penalty regime dominates the
authorization regime for ￿ 2 (￿0;￿1):




, E(WLA(￿)) = E(WP(￿)), being both given by the expression in
the third line of (21), so that the penalty regime and the lenient authorization regime are
equivalent.




we have E(WSA(￿)) > E(WLA(￿)) = E(WP(￿)), so that the strict
authorization regime dominates.
Let us complete the proof by considering the case in which ￿ > w ￿ w, so that ￿0 =
￿1 = 0. In this case, the ￿rst and second intervals considered above are empty, and only
the third and fourth are not.
Proof of Proposition 2. The level of innovative activity chosen by the ￿rm is given
by (13) in the laissez faire and penalty regimes, and by (5) and (7) in the lenient and strict
￿20 ￿authorization regimes, respectively. Therefore, recalling the optimal policies in Proposition
1, for ￿ 2 [0;￿0], b I(￿) is obtained by setting f = 0 in (13), which yields a constant ￿a=c.











, the lenient authorization and the penalty regime









the strict authorization regime
dominates, so that innovative activity equals the expression for ISA(￿) in (7), which is
clearly decreasing and strictly lower than ILA(￿) in (5). Hence, the optimal investment
jumps down at ￿ = e ￿ and decreases for higher values of ￿. To show the second part of the
proposition, recall that the ￿rst-best level of innovative activity is IFB = (1￿￿)wa=c. This
exceeds the equilibrium investment ￿a=c if ￿ is close to 0, since w > ￿ by assumption. By the
same token, if ￿ is close to 1 there is overinvestment: IFB < b I(￿) = ISA(￿) = (1￿￿)p￿a=c.
Proof of Proposition 3. Comparing the lenient authorization and the penalty regimes
yields




while comparing the strict authorization and the penalty regimes yields







which is positive for ￿ > w=(w + w). But using (23) and (24), one sees that
E(WLA) >E(WSA) for ￿ 6 w=(w+w) and E(WLA) >E(WSA) otherwise. Hence, the lenient
authorization regime is optimal for ￿ 6 w=(w+w), while strict authorization is optimal for
￿ > w=(w + w).
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Figure 2: Time line in the penalty regime
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Figure 3: Actions, pro￿ts and ￿nes
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